

南寧北緯二十三度東經百八度三十分

柳州北緯二十四度二十分東經百九度二十分

桂林北緯二十五度二十分東經百十度十分

芷江北緯二十七度三十分東經百九度四十分

衡陽北緯二十七度 東經百十二度三十分

支那側ハ之等飛行場ニガソリン、爆彈ヲ貯藏スルコトニ同意ス

支那ハ英國ガ下記ノ地域飛行場ヨリ臺灣及ビ日本本土ヲ直接空襲スル事ヲ提案セリ。

温州、寧州府、建甌

英國ハ下記地域ニ於テ日本軍ニ對シゲリラ戰ヲ促進スル意向ナリ

宜昌、荊州、漢陽、湘潭、長沙、岳州、南昌、亳州、九江、蘇州、常

州、太平、廣甯、江門、支那海—SHANCHUNG 相互協力ノ協

約ハビルマニ於テ七月第一週英支幹部會合ニ於テ取極メラルル筈、

オリア署名  
グルナート

「眞珠灣攻撃」第三四部一六六頁

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
22 November 1940.

(1) Confidential

November 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A.A. defense measures including mobile batteries; and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

(2) Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road passing near by.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to maintain a security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance is the security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.

I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It really is immaterial so long as we get the answer - but after all the Fleet - your command -

D. D. 1500-T-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
22 November 1940.

is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.

My best to you both and to "all your works" -

Sincerely,

H.R.S.

Op-12-VED  
Serial 050312 (SC) A16/FF1





辯護側文書 第一五〇〇號—T—  
エイチ、アール、スターク提督兼リジエー、オー、リチャードソン  
提督宛書翰

(一) 極秘

ジョー 殿

一九四〇年十一月二十二日

十月初旬貴下の當地滞在中、我々は第十四管區司令全部宛電報を送り、ハワイの海軍軍事施設の最重要部分に對する警備が満足すべきものであるかどうかをブロッツク提督に確かめようと思いました。これは我々が陸軍省に對し、要すればハワイ管區として一層充分な警備をする様に指令を發せしめるべく建議せんがためでした。

ブロッツク提督の右電報及同問題に關する第二信に對する返事は全く明確なものでなかつた、又陸軍省がそれ以上の行動をとることを根據づけるものでもありません。

鳳珠灣内の艦隊の安全性に對して今までとても大きな懸念を持つ





てゐたが、タラント事件以來は更に大きな懸念を抱くに至つた次第です。此の懸念はハワイ在住日本人側の活躍の可能性及海上より來るべき攻撃の可能性の兩者に關係するものでした。ハワイ水域内急變の最も有利な目的物は該區域に基地を持つ艦隊でありませう。固より之等艦隊の安全性は最上のものであり、且つ司令長官及水上部隊に其の責任がかゝつてゐるのであつて、又それには第十四管區司令官及陸軍の完全な支援を受けねばなりません。余は貴下が本問題に廣く考察を加へて居られることを最もよく知つて居ます。貴下に本便を出す目的は陸海軍省が設備や警備手段の爲、如何なる措置を講じつつあるべきかを知らんが爲であります。

例へば港の内部へ水雷防禦網を設置するのがよいのではないか？本問題に對する貴下並に第十四管區司令部の御批判を承ることが出來れば幸いです。

對空警備は先づ、實際に眞珠灣内に在つて當時射撃準備態勢にある艦隊に依り其の備へをすることが出來ます又海軍造船所の周圍に

移動砲臺をはじめ陸軍防空隊の警備階段を配置することに依り又眞珠灣地區内で現在自由になる海兵警備隊防空部隊又は今後使へる機に爲し得べき斯かる部隊を利用することに依り、更に又艦載機部隊で警戒させ常に出發準備態勢に置いておくことに依つても、出來ます。

「今一つの地區的な安全確保の問題は、その爲に陸軍省の抑々の電信が出されたのでありますが油槽の安全をその傍を通つてある道路からの攻撃に對して確保することでありました。」

余は貴下が、ハワイ歸任と共に、第十四管區司令部は陸軍と全問題を上げられ、常ワシントンに於て善後策を講ずる必要のある快報は何事でも御報らせあらん事を望みます

パナマ運河の安全を確保する爲に陸軍並に之を援ける海軍は大なる努力を傾注してあります。少くとも之と同じ重要性を持つものは破綻的な急變に對し我が艦隊の安全を確保することです。そして艦隊は通常當然のことではあるが、一層敵に目標とされる立場にあるも

のです

余は本便を貴下に出すべきか、或はブロック提督に出して、貴下や陸軍と共に問題を取上げる幾同様な書信を出すべきかに付稍々迷つてゐます我々が返事を得られさへすれば、實際上それは重要なことではないが、結局艦隊―貴下の指揮―それが主眼です。ブロック提督にも本便の寫を送ります。

貴下方御兩者並びに「貴下のすべての仕事」の成功を祈り乍ら

敬具

・エツチ、アール、スターク

O P I - N I V E D O H O 三一二號 (S O ) A 一六、F F I



Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(13) 28 November 1941 from Adj Gen to Short. Subject: Sabotage

(13) Secret  
114 War Kr 189 WD Prty  
Washn D.C. 842P Nov. 28, 1941  
C G  
Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T.H.

Priority

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS.

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

Secret

(13) 28 November 1941 from Adj Gen to Short. Subject: Sabotage

(13) Secret  
114 War Kr 189 WD Prty  
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C G  
Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T.H.

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Page 1330 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

tection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions



MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(13) 28 November 1941 from Adj Gen to Short. Subject: Sabotage

(和議使事館第一五〇〇一―二號)  
第七十九回米國議會第一回真珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會の證據事項第三十二  
號抜萃

證據事項第三十二號

一九四一年七月八日より九月七日までの海軍省及ハワイ島の通信

(十三) 一九四一年九月二十八日高級副官發、ショート宛、息果の件

(十三) 敬察、優先扱

一一四 WARR 一八九 海軍省優先扱

ワシントン D.C. 一九四一年十一月二十八日午後八時四十二分發

ハワイ領域、シヤフター要港内ハワイ部宛

二十日午後八時四十二分發した情勢に依り破壊的活動に備えて凡ゆる

裏前の措置を海軍省の調査責任範圍内で直ちに要する必要がある。(S C

三〇乃至四五中の第三節參照)

又海軍省の建造物、財産の保護、息果對策、破壊的宣傳に對する責任部員  
の保護及び全防務活動の保護を要する爲めに必要を凡ゆる追加的措置を即



意にとるべきであらう。右は如何なる非合法的措置をとつてもよいといふ意味ではない。保護対象は安全保障に必要と認めらるるものに限られ、不必要な宣伝、警告を避くべきである。通報や迅速ならしめる為、同文の電報を全放送局宛に発信したが右は現在の場合に基く貴下の責任に影響を與へるものではない。

アダムス

(私書)

(「原稿」第十四巻第一三三〇頁)



Defense Doc. 1500-T-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States. Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(35) 27 November 1941 to OPNAV38S, Action: COM ALNAL COAST  
FRON COM 14, 16, CINPAC, CINCAF

(35) Top Secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV 38S

Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16  
CINCPAC, CINCAF.

Info: CINCLANT

271519

On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship codes may be compromised the use of secret positions in assignmer of routes for merchant ships will be initiated as rapidly as possible and instructions for their use given to masters as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without disclosing to axis nations the location of our ships.

(Page 1406, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯證側書類一五〇〇一丁一三號

眞珠灣攻撃調査ニ關スル共同委員會

書證第三七號ヨリノ拔萃一米國第七十九國會

第一期

書證第三七號

發信電報ニ關スル主要書證

(三五) 一九四一年十一月二十七日附、海軍作戰部、關係行動者、海軍  
沿岸警備隊全指揮官、第十四、十六司令官、太平洋方面司令長  
官、太平洋艦隊司令長官宛

(三五) 極 秘

一九四一年十一月二十七日附

發信者 海軍作戰部

關係行動者 海軍沿岸警備隊全指揮官、第十四、十六司令官、太平  
洋方面司令長官、大西洋艦隊司令長官



情報通告先 大西洋方面司令長官(CINCLANT)

二七一五一九

現行又ハソノ改定商船用暗號ノ所設ノ危険性アルニ鑑ミ、商船ノ航路  
指定ニ際シテハ秘匿位置ノ使用ヲ可及的速カニ開始シ、諸船長ニ對シ  
テハ其ノ使用ニ關スル指示事項ヲ通達スル意嚮デアル。斯カル措置ニ  
ヨリ我方諸船組ノ位置ヲ樞軸側ニ暴露スルコトナク、索制行動ニ關ス  
ル諸指令ヲ通達シ得ルカラデアル。

2

(「真珠灣攻撃」第十四卷一四〇六頁)



**Note:**

The attached document is the corrected document and should be substituted for the corresponding document which should be destroyed.

Defense Doc. 1500-T-4

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 50 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 50.

MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 11...

Classified SECRET

Auth: WOGS

Date: 5 Dec 45

Initials:

A M E R I C A N - D U T C H - B R I T I S H

C O N V E R S A T I O N S

SINGAPORE, APRIL, 1941

(Short Title - "A.D.B.")

R E P O R T

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,  
China Station,  
27th April, 1941.

(Page 1551, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

MOST SECRET.

A.D.B.  
Page 14

. . . . .  
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,  
APRIL 1941.

IV - ACTION OPEN TO THE ASSOCIATED POWERS.

28. To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at the present time must be defensive. There, are, however, certain measures open to us which will assist greatly in the defence of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

29. It is important to organise air operations against Japanese occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to in pars. 21 above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defences of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

30. Other positive activities which may be undertaken are as follows: -

- (a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid and provision of equipment.
- (b) Operation of Guerillas in China.
- (c) Organisation of subversive activities in Japan.

31. So far as economic pressure is concerned, the entry of the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war against Japan would automatically restrict Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will be in the war against her, and our submarine and air forces should be able to interfere considerably with trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from the outset.

. . . . .

(Page 1565, Part 15 "Pearl Harbor Attack")



.....

MOST SECRET.

A.D.B.  
Page 25.

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,  
APRIL 1941.

VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (contd.)

.....

OTHER OPERATIONS.

78. (a) Support to Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid, provision of equipment and establishment of military and air missions. A British nucleus Mission is already established, and a United States Mission possible combined with the British Mission would be of considerable value, and it is recommended that preparations to establish it should now be made.

(b) The operating of Chinese Guerilla Forces armed, equipped and directed by the Associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organise such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organise similar guerilla forces.

(c) The organisation of subversive activities, sabotage and corruption in Japan and Japanese occupied territories. Activities of this kind are already being organised by the British Government. It is recommended that the United States Government should also undertake such activities and co-ordinate them closely with those of the British.

.....

Excerpt from the testimony of General George C. Marshall before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session - December 12, 1945.

.....

Mr. KEEFE. And on the 10th of January 1941 the lease-lend bill was introduced in the Congress on March 11, 1941, that became law and we immediately began to give supplies under that to England and our other later allies, did we not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.  
rial aid, if you remember?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the exact figures. I remember particularly our maneuvering to get the planes for the Air Force out there operated under General Chennault.

Mr. KEEFE. General Chennault was a former officer in the United States Air Corps, was he not?

General MARSHALL. Yes. He had resigned, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. Resigned, and went over and became Air Chief to Chiang Kai-shek.

General MARSHALL. In the service of the Chinese Government.

Mr. KEEFE. He recruited a good many Americans to go over to fly planes under his command?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And planes were furnished to him by the United States Government?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember the arrangements as to financing, but I know that I personally initiated the procedure, a proposed details which were followed out.

Mr. KEEFE. We perhaps loaned money to China and they then bought our planes. Is that what it was?

General MARSHALL. I would prefer not to answer that.

(3632) Mr. KEEFE. I see.

.....

辯護人文書 一五〇〇一ター五

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會ニ於ケル「デヨード・シー・マーシャル  
大將ノ證言拔萃」合衆國第七十九議會第二期一九四五年十二月十二日  
カーフ氏（K R R F R）

一九四一年一月十日貸與法案ハ議會ニ提出サレ、一九四一年三月十二  
日法律トナリ我等ハ直チニ英國及ビ後日ノ我等ノ連合軍ニ對シ同法ノ  
許ニ供給ヲ開始セリ。ソウデハナカツタデスカ、

マーシャル大將

ソウデシタ。本營ノ援助、貴國ガ御記憶サレルナラバ。

マーシャル大將

正確ナル數字ハ想ヒ出シマセン。シエンノート大將ノ許ニ行動スル

空軍ノタメ飛行機ヲ得ルタメノ運動ハ特ニ記憶シテ居マス

カーフ氏

シエンノート大將ハ合衆國空軍ノ前將校デハナカツタデスカ。



マーシャル大將

ソウデシタ。彼ハ辭職シタト私ハ信ジマス

カーフ氏

辭職シテ蔭介石ノ空軍司令官トナリマシタ。

マーシャル大將

支那政府ニ奉職シマシタ

カーフ氏

彼ハ彼ノ命令ノ許ニ飛ブ相當數ノ米人ヲ支那行ノタメ徵募シマシタカ

マーシャル大將

シマシタ。

カーフ氏

合衆國政府ハ彼レニ飛行機ヲ供給シマシタカ

マーシャル大將

私ハ財政的打合せニ付テハ記憶シマセンガ私自身手帳ヲ始メ後デ實行サレタ詳細ヲ提案シタコトハ知ツテ居マス。

キーフ氏

多分我等ハ支那ニ借款ヲ與ヘ支那ハソレニ依リ飛行機ヲ買ツタノデハ  
アリマセンカ

マーシャル大將

私ハソレニ對シテハ返事ヲシナイ事ヲ好ミマス

キーフ氏

ワカリマシタ

「眞珠灣攻撃」第三部ページ一三八三―一三八四

D. D. 1500-J-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
28 November 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Long Beach, California  
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard



Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
28 November 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time, the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possibility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force and all their equipment, including organic transportation and ground unit support for their aircraft.

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- (c) In any concept, something will have to be done about landing boats. I assume that all transports will carry the boats listed in your conversion letter. These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport must either be provided from the supporting ships (manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the transport area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers. I believe we should convert a special boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used at Shanghai by the Japanese.

D. D. 1500-U41

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
28 November 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

- (d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.
- (e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.
- (f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.
- (g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns.
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I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude.

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D. D. 1500-U-1

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28 November 1940.

CinC File No.                      UNITED STATES FLEET  
                                    U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

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Christmas Island -- if found suitable  
Palmyra Island    -- probably will limit force  
                                    that can be employed to less  
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One of Hawaiian  
Islands

Please let me know as soon as possible your decision as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the conversion of the transports, the provision of landing boats, boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson  
Sincerely,

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Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.



D. D. 1500-U-1

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28 November 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Long Beach, California  
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard

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With best regards,

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Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

辯護側書類 第一千五百號ロノ一

千九百四十年（昭和十五年）十一月二十八日附書簡

ジエー・オー・リチャードソン提督ヨリエイチ・アール・スターク提督宛  
司令長官綴込文書番號

アメリカ合衆國艦隊アメリカ合衆國軍艦旗艦ニミー・メヤレコ號

カリフォルニア州ロングビーチ

千九百四十年（昭和十五年）十一月二十八日

ベツタイー君

布哇地域ニ活動中ノ艦隊ノ保護ニ關シ又艦隊附屬海兵隊第二軍ノ同艦隊  
中ニオケル第三期作戰ノ展望ニ關シテノ貴翰ニ通落手致シマシタ。

此二ツノ問題ノ第一ニ就キマシテハ小生布哇諸任ノ上ブロック氏ト審議  
致シマシヌ。コノ方面ノ問題ハ大シテ小生ニハ心配ニナリマセン。且ツ私  
ノ考ヘマス所デハ簡單ニ處理シ得ル所ト思ハレマス。港灣内ニ防雷網ヲ張  
ルコトハ必要デモナク、又實行可能デモナイト小生ハ考ヘマス。同地域ハ



餘リニモ制限セラレテ居リ又目下軍艦ハ港口カラ魚雷發射程内ニハ碇泊シ  
 マセン。ソレヨリ心配ナノハ各部隊ノ常規活動中ノ安全防備デアリマス。  
 蓋シ相當程度ノ安全防禦ヲ施スニハ當ニ安全防禦ノ目的ダケニデモ大部隊  
 ヲ使用スルノ必要ヲ生ジ訓練活動ニ向ケタイ多クノ時間ト勞力トヲコレニ  
 消耗スルコトニナリマス。私ノ思ヒマスニ艦隊ハ次ノ二ツノ事柄ノ一ツヲ  
 前提トシテ行動シナケレバナリマセン。即チ(1)目下ハ平和狀態ニ在ツテ何  
 等安全防禦手段ヲ講ズル必要ナキコト或ハ(2)戰時安全防禦手段ヲ講ジナケ  
 レバナラヌコトノイツレカデス。今日マデノ所デハ安全防禦手段ヲ一定ノ  
 範圍内デ講ジテ來マシタガコレハ主トシテ訓練ノ基礎トシテ行ハレ又列國  
 ニシテ我ノ艦隊ヲ襲撃シ自ラ好ンデ戰爭ヲ誘發セントスルモノハナイカ、  
 指導ヲ誤マツタ又ハ血迷ツタ國民ノ中ニハ或ヒハ吾ノ艦隊ニ個人的ニ無責  
 任ナミヤカニ加ヘルモノガナイトモ限ラナイトイフ事ヲ假定シテ講ジ來ツタ  
 安全防禦手段デアリマス。所デ私ハ此レ等ノ問題ニ關スル負下ノ懸念ヲ考  
 慮シ又小生ニ比シテ貴下ヨリハ多ク情報ニ接セラレ將來ニ於テ發生可能性  
 アル事柄ヲ測定スルニ好都合ナル位地ニ立ツテ居ラレル事情ニ鑑ミテ小生



ハ次ノ如キ結論ニ到達シマシタ即チ上記(b)ノ事項ヲ基礎トシテ動作シナケ  
レバナラスト。小生ノ眞珠港到着次第發表豫定ノ指令草案ヲ同封デオ送り  
致シマス。コレハ必然的ニ新兵員特ニ驅逐艦ト飛行機ノ搭乗員ニ最モ必要  
トスル基礎訓練ヲ短縮シナケレバナラスト結果トナリ又今日以上ノ困難不快  
ヲ更ニ或ル程度忍バナケレバナラスト結果トモナルノデアリマスガ、コレハ  
(b)ヲ前提トスル以上甘受セネバナラストデアリマス。

艦隊附屬海兵隊第二軍トノ共同演習ニ關シマシテハ取初ハ一月二十日ヲ  
試験的ニ演習ノ期日ト定メマシタガコレハ一月一日マデニ完成スル輸送船  
ノ準備終了ト本省ノ希望トヲ基礎トシテ立タモノデアリマス。本省ノ希  
望トイフノハ私ノ了解スルトコロデハコノ演習ヲ本省ノ國際的外交的意圖  
ニ俟メルモノノ如クデアリマシタガ十月十日附クツク氏ヨリ貴下宛覺書參  
照一勿論私ハ本省ノ國際的意圖ガドノ程度迄變ツタカ又コノ演習ガ今日ド  
ウシテコノ意圖ニ俟ルモノカ解リマセン。本書面御一讀下サレバオ解リニ  
ナルト思ヒマスガ、コノ事ハ右ノ演習ノ解釋ニ大キナ相異ヲ生メルノデア  
リマス。

小生ノ受取ツタ報道ニ依レバ「シテイ」型輸送船ノ最終ノ船ガ海軍工廠デ完了スルノハ一月二十三日デ、ソノ上ニ海軍造船所デ機装期間七日ヲ要シマス。決定日ガ守ラレルトセバ二月一日迄ニ他ノ四隻ノ「シテイ」船トエキゾコード號ヲ算入シコレデ六隻ノ輸送船ヲ得ルコトニナリマス。訓練及ビ完成ノ期間ニ要スル時日ノ餘裕ヲ見ルト大約三月一日以前ニ海兵隊ヲ乗船セシムルコトハ不可能ト考ヘラレマスノデ布哇地域デノ演習ヲ實際開始スルノハ三月十日頃ニナリマセウ。海兵隊ヨリ小生宛ノ報道ニ依レバ、海兵隊ニハ其レ迄ニ兵員約一万二千名入隊シソノ全軍ヲ参加セシムルモノトセバ、少クトモ更ニ六隻ノ輸送船ヲ要シマス。其所デ問題トナルノハ演習ノ目標デアリマス。最初私ノ了解シタコロデハ、コレハ本格的ノ島嶼襲撃ノ豫行演習デアリ、コノ襲撃演習ハ、何時「本物」ニナルカモ知レナイ可能性ヲ持ツタモノデアリマシタ。コレヲ目標トスルナラバ我々ハ勿論全軍隊トソノ全裝備計畫的輸送設備及ビ空軍附屬ノ地上部隊ヲモ含メテ輸送シタイノデアリマス。

併シ若シコノ演習ガ主トシテ練習的ノモノデソノ目標ガ明確ニ限定サレ

テキルトスレバ兵員及ビ軍裝備品ヲ運送船六隻ヲ以テ運搬セ得ル程度ノ  
 數量ニ制限シ兵員ヲ略々完全セル戰團團體（各運送船ニ一團體宛分乘）  
 ニ編成シ斯クスルコトニ依ツテ海兵隊、輸送船及ビ補助部隊ニソレ等ガ  
 大イニ必要トスル所ノ訓練ヲ充分施スコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。コレ  
 ヲ前是トシテ行ヘバ演習ヲ更ニ早ク即チ更ニ六隻ノ運送船ヲ待ツ必要  
 ナク一舉行スルコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。且ツ恐ラク、第一回ノ演習  
 ニ次グニ第二回ノ演習ヲ以テコレニ最初ニ得テ經驗ヲ廣用シ殘餘ノ部  
 隊ヲ使用スルコトガ出來ルノデアリマス。上記ノ問題ガ決定スル迄ハ私  
 トシテハコノ問題ノ一般の立案ヲ研究スル外仕事ガアリマセン。

コノ問題ニ關連スル豫備審議カラ次ノ事項ガ明カニナツテ來マス。

(a) 海兵隊ノ有スル飛行隊ハ僅カニ二箇中隊ニ過ギズ。コノ飛行隊ハ空  
 母ニ搭載シ得ベキモ演習範圍ノ如何ニ依ツテ地上部隊及ビ軍裝品ノ運搬  
 用トシテ他ニ船舶一隻乃至一隻以上（恐ラク貨物船）ヲ要スベシ。

(b) 若シ演習範圍ガ更ニ起リ得ベキ偶發事件ヘノ準備ヲ含ム場合ニハ計  
 畫的運送設備ト九十日間ノ彈藥ト補給品ヲ運搬スルタメニ少クトモ一  
 隻  
 恐ラク二隻ノ貨物船ヲ別ニ又必要トスベシ。



(D) 目的の範圍如何ヲ問ハズ、上陸用舟艇ニ關シテ何等カノ措置ヲ講ジナケ  
レバナラヌ。船體改造ニ關スル貴翰ニ御記載ノ上陸用舟艇ハ、何レノ輸送船  
モノノ運搬ニ協力シマセウ。コレ等輸送船ハ、大凡、一隻ニツキ五百舟艇分  
ノスペースヲ有スルモ、一戰團團體上陸ニハ千百隻ヲ要ス。故ニ殘余ノ六百  
舟艇分ノスペースハ補助船ニ求メルカ（コレハ明カニ望マシカラザル所デア  
ルガ）、或ヒハ特別貨物船或ハ舟艇母船ニヨツテ運輸區域内ニ運搬シナケレ  
バナラヌ。コノ目的ノタメニハ何レカノ船舶ヲ特別ノ舟艇母船ニ改造シテ日  
本軍ガ上海ニ於テ使用セルガ如キモノトスベキデアルト私ハ信ズル。

(E) 輸送船ノ乗組員數ヲ出來ルダケ多クシテ、搭載セル舟艇ニ要スル乗組員  
掛員、及ビ組織サレタル上陸部隊ニコレヲ當テル。舟艇母船ノ便アラバ、コ  
レニ舟艇ト共ニ所要數ノ舟艇乗組員ヲ搭載ス。

(F) 輸送船ハ舟艇ニヨリ陸上ニ運搬可能ナル淡水用特別水槽カ乃至ハ輸送軍  
除用々水運搬ノタメニ充分ナル數ノドラム罐カ、何レカラ裝備品中ニ含メネ  
バナラヌ。

(F) 以上ノ外、偶然性事項ニ對シテ準備スル所アルトセバ、自分トシテハ、

・ハリカン。シーメン號（蒸溜船トシテ特別施設ヲ施セル海事協會練習船）ヲ接收シ、コレヲ使用シタシ

(d) 海兵隊用彈藥事情ハ重大危機ニアル。海兵隊司令部ハ必ズヤコノ事態ヲ承知シ居ルモノト思フモソノ重大ナルコト極言スルモ猶コレ足ラザルノ有様デアアル。コレ等海兵隊ハ又目下使用中ノ取扱不便ナル重砲ニ代フルニテ裝包曲射砲ヲ必要トス

(e) 有能ニシテ精力的ナ輸送國司令官ヲ可選的ニ選任スルヲ要ス。コレハ困難ナ任務デ海兵隊員ト勞苦ヲ共ニシ得ル力量ヲ要ス。密接ナル協力ニ依ルニアラザレバ完成不能ノ事項多シ。各輸送船準備完了次第サン。ダイエゴ一地域ニ於テ輸送船ヲ動かシ、積込乗船下船上陸等ノ訓練練習ヲ行フコト、目下小官ハ企圖シテキル。

(1) 戰ニ備ヘテ砲撃用彈藥準備ノ要アリ貯蔵ノ場所ハ望ムラクハオアイフ島トス蓋シ同島ハ必要ニ應ジテ上記砲撃用彈藥ヲ實彈藥ニ取替ヘ得ル便ガアル。目下西部海岸ニアルコノ種ノ彈藥ハ小官ノ知ル限りデハ「十四。五〇インチ」一六。五三インチ一五。五一インチノミニシテ、コレハ

掩護射撃ヲ戰艦輕巡洋艦（七千五百噸）ニ限ルコト、ナル。然ルニ此等艦ノ任務トシテ指示サレテキルノハ實ハ重巡、輕巡（一万噸）及ビ驅逐艦デアル。

海兵隊ニ目下ノ計畫立案ノ基礎トシテ、私ハ次ノヤウニ申シテ置キマシタ、即チ海兵隊第二軍戰團員ノ内輸送船六隻ニ搭乗シ得ルダケノ兵員ヲ聚セ、而シテ此等戰團員ハ携帶シ得ルダケノ裝備ヲナシテ出發シ、以テ東經五六十度以東ニ起リ得ル如何ナル作戰ニ對シテモ、ソレニ應ジ得ル用意ヲスベキデアルト。

クリスマス島及ビマキン島偵察ノ外交手續ニ關スル十月三十一日附會面ニ對スル回答ハ末ダアリマセン。勿論クリスマス島ノ適不適ニ關スル決定ハ偵察ヲ俟ツテ成サレルノデアリマスガ、若シ同島上陸ガ決行サレルモノトスレバ特ニ外交上ノ手續ヲ踏マネバナリマセン。オアフ島乃至同島ニ匹敵スル位ノ大キナ島ナラバ上陸後引續キ演習ガデキマスノデ、アツツシヤ大將ハ上記島嶼ニオケル演習ヲ可トシテキマス。併シコノ問題ハ今直グ決定スルコトハ出來マセン。



私ノ考ヘデハ、下記ノ島嶼モ演習ノ場所トシテ可能性ガアルト思ヒマヘ  
クリスマス島。コレハ適當ト認メラレタ場合。

バルマイラ島 本島ハ、使用兵員數ヲ輸送船六隻ニ搭乗シ得ル數ヨリ遙カ  
ニ少クスル必要ガアルマセウ。

布哇群島中ノ一島

演習ノ概念及ビ範圍ニ關スル貴下ノ御決定成ルベク早く御一報下サイ。  
輸送船ノ準備其他ノ進行ノ模様ヲ御報知下サレバ幸甚デス。 敬具

ジエー。オー。リチャードソン署名

ワシントン。海軍省海軍作戰部長

エーチ。アール。スターク大將閣下

Defense Doc. 1500-U-2

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(14) 28 November 1941 from Arnold to Hawaiian Air Force.  
Subject: Sabotage

(14) secret

Priority

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaii Department, Fort Shafter, T.H.:

Sent No. 484, 11/28.

Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para it is also desired that or on before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.

ADAMS.

A.F. No. 461

Secret

(Page 1330 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



辯證側文書一五〇〇一U一ニ

合衆國第七十九議會第一會期  
眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會議證據文書第三十三號ヨリノ抄萃  
證據文書第三十二號

陸軍省布告間通報、自一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月八日至九月七日

（十四）一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十八日 アーノルドヨリ 布哇空軍宛

主 題 —— サボターデユ

（十四）秘

發信番號四八四、十一月二十八日

優先順位

布哇領土シアフター要塞、ハワイ部司令官宛

布哇空軍司令官へ達ス。要領欠ノ如キ指令ヲ貴官統率並ニ指揮下ノ  
全官衛及び部隊ニ授セラレ度シ、即チ陸軍省ノ調査責任ノ範圍内ニ





於ケル破壊的行動ニ對シ（第三節中部S.R.三〇一四五參照）目下ノ  
危險ナル狀態ハ凡ユル豫防策ヲ直チニ議ズルヲ要ス。且ツ又以下ノ  
諸項ニ備フル爲メ必要ナル凡ユル附加的對策ガ貴官ニヨリ即刻着手  
セラルルヲ要ス、即チ破壊的宣傳ニ對シ貴官ノ人員ヲ防霧スルコト  
間諜ニ對シ凡ユル活動ヲ防霧スルコト、及び貴官ノ施設、財産及ビ  
官舎等ノサボターデユニ對スル防備、凡ユル非合法的手段ハ之ヲ認  
メザルコトハ繰返シ述ベズ。不必要ナル言報ト宣傳ヲ禁ケ防霧策ハ  
保安ニ缺クベカラザルモノノミニ限定サルベシ。（尙本年十二月五  
日又ハソレ以前ニ陸軍空軍長官宛貴官ガ是等指令ニ基ツキ着手サレ  
タル凡ユル處置ニツキ報告アリ度ン）

署名アーノルド。アダムス

A.F. 第四六一號

秘

（「眞珠灣攻撃」第十四卷 一三三〇頁）

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(36) 27 November 1941 to CNO, Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC.

(36) Top Secret

November 7, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC

Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

272337

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD, War Dept.

(Page 1406, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



Def. Doc. # 1500-U 3

海軍側書類 一五〇〇一U一三

原珠濫攻撃調査ニ關スル共同委員會製作

海軍第三七號ヨリノ拔萃一米國第七九國會、第一會期

海軍第三七號

發信電報ニ關スル主要書證

(三六) 一九四一年十一月二十七日附海軍作戰部、關係行動者

太西洋艦隊司令官、太平洋方面司令官宛

(三六) 極 秘

一九四一年十一月七日附

發信者 海軍作戰部長

關係行動者 太西洋艦隊司令長官、太平洋方面司令長官

情報通告先 太西洋方面司令長官 CINCINNATI

海軍特別作戰部 SPENAVO

二七二三三七

本電報ハ戦争情報ト見做サルルベキモノデアル。





憲 願 布 先 W P D

陸 軍 省

太平洋状態ノ安定ヲ企圖セル對日交渉ハ終焉ヲ告ゲ、今後數日中ニ日本ハ何ラカノ具體的行動ニ移ルモノト豫想サレル。日本軍ノ兵力及ビ整備、並ビニ海軍機動部隊ノ編成ヨリ見レバ、フィリッピン、華重又ハクラ半島、或ハムラクホルネオニ對スル海陸兩面ヨリスル攻略ガ予期サレル。W P D  
西大縣ニ示セル任務達成ニ備ヘ適切ナル防禦配置ヲ實施セヨ。管區並ビニ陸軍當局ニモ右ノ旨通報セヨ。陸軍省ヨリモ同趣旨ノ通報ヲ發令サレツ、アリ。S P L N M V O  
ハ英露實ニモ通報セヨ。大陸方面、並ビニガム、サモアニ對シテハ怠慢ニ對スル万全ノ措置ヲ執ルベキ旨發令シタ。

Excerpt from the testimony of General George C. Marshall before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session - December 8, 1945.

.....

General MARSHALL. This plan was to meet a probable, as we understood it, Japanese operation to the south of the China Sea.

(3235) Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Churchill made the statement sometime before the war started, as far as America was concerned December 7, that in case Japan attacked America they would be in with us in 1 or 2 hours, or whatever the time was?

General MARSHALL. I have a recollection of some such statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that have been in reply to this plan then?

General MARSHALL. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they to come in if Hawaii alone were to be attacked?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or was it a one-sided plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was one-sided.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know what your opinion is on it.

General MARSHALL. It says "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the associated powers." That is a very general statement, and can cover Hawaii also. "It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute 'a direct act of war.' It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be (3236) resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned."

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out whether this plan went into effect prior to December 7.

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain it did not go into effect because it never was implemented, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 25, it says, at the bottom of the page - will you read that (b), the last paragraph?

General MARSHALL (reading):

The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerilla forces.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

General MARSHALL. So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force the Flying Tigers.

Senator FERGUSON. The Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. Yes; because I took the action to get (3237) them the planes personally.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of air-men, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.



The planes were obtained - is there any interest in that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. The planes were obtained on the basis of an English contract for planes, I think, with the Curtiss Co., and when that contract had been fulfilled, it was possible for the plant to turn out a certain number of planes during the next few months, if they immediately started, within 10 days, using the parts that were then available; otherwise their assembly lines would change.

Under the contract arrangement we had, which controlled the Curtiss Co.'s operations with the British, our Government, meaning the War Department in general, and Air Corps people in particular, could control the question (3237) of whether or not those planes should be manufactured beyond the contract terms.

The problem was to obtain planes immediately for the Chinese.

The planes which would have been fabricated out of this available extra material of course would not have been completed for 3 or 4 months.

We could kill that, so far as the British getting the benefit of those additional planes, or, as I used it, we could, on a trade basis, require them to take immediate delivery of completed planes that were going to them, to the Chinese, and we later would allow them to take these additional planes that were manufactured from the accumulated material.

(3239) I saw Mr. Sumner Welles and he took up the adjustment with the British, and they submitted to that condition, and we got 50 in January or February, and 50 more in February or March. They were all for the Flying Tigers; they were sent out to the Far East. The men that were recruited by the Chinese and we released where they happened to be reserve officers, also, proceeded to the Far East.

My next recollection of the matter is while we had obtained the planes on that basis by a twist of the British contract, we now found ourselves in the predicament of having to provide the guns and ammunition, which we did not have available, and we had a hard time arming the planes.

That was the one definite force that I recall, prior to December 7, 1941, we organized to the extent that I have just described.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, was that an activating of this Exhibit 50 plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was that. It came actually out of a visit here of T. V. Soong with the head of the Chinese Air. I took them out to my house for lunch and they made an impressive picture of the circumstances and the great good such action would do and I immediately undertook the obtaining of that materiel. That was without regard to this plan, and what I was referring to here is the (3240) continuation of that.

.....



辯證側文書一五〇〇一〇一五

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會ニ於ケル「チヨージ・シー・マーシャル大將」ノ證言」拔萃一合衆國第七十九議會第二期一九四五年十二月八日

マーシャル大將

我等ノ解スル處ニヨシバ本計畫ハ支那海ノ南部ニ於ケル日本ノ可能性アル作戦ニ對抗セントスルモノデアツタ

(三八二五) フアーグソン上院議員 (F. H. G. SON)

開戦前チャーチルガ十二月七日亞米利加ニ關スル限り日本ガアメリカヲ攻撃シタ場合彼等ハ一時間或ハ二時間以内一時間ハドウデモヨイガ一ニ参入スルト云フステートメントヲ發表シタ事實ヲ御存ジデシタカ。

マーシャル大將

左様ナスステートメントノアツタコトヲ思ヒ出シマス

フアーグソン上院議員

其ノステートメントハ當時本計畫ニ關ジチナサレタモノデアシヨウカ

マーシャル大將

ワカリマセン

フアীগソン上院議員

布哇ガ攻堅サレヨノミデ彼等ハ參戰スルノダツタデシヨウカ

マーシャル大將

其レニ對スル返答ハ出來マセン

フアীগソン上院議員

或ハ一方的計畫デシタカ

マーシャル大將

一方的ノモノデアツタトハ思ヒマセン

フアীগソン上院議員

本件ニ關シアタタノ御意見チ一寸知リタイノデスガ

マーシャル大將

「連合國領土或ハ其ノ委任統治領ニ對スル日本ノ直接軍事行動」トアリマス・ソレハ一般的ステートメントデアツテ布哇モフクミ得マス。

「直接軍事行動」トハ如何ナル内容ノモノナリヤトノ正確ナ定義ハ可能デハアリマセン。技術的ニハ戦争行爲デモ小事件ハ外交手段ニ依ツテ解決スル事ハ可能デス（三二三六）。斯カル小事件ガ戦争行爲ナルヤ否ヤチ決定スル事ハ關係政府ノナスベキ事ト認メラレテ居マス。

フアーグソン上院議員

私ハ本計畫ガ十二月七日前ニ實施セラシヤ否ヤチ發見セシトシテ居ル  
ノデス

マーシャル大將

本計畫ガ實施サレナカツタ事ハ確カデス、ソレハ履行サレタコトガナ  
カツタカラデス

フアーグソン上院議員

第二十五ページノ下部最終ノ一節（五）ヲ讀ンデ下サイ

マーシャル大將（讀ミナガラ）

連合國ニ依リ裝備サレ指揮サレシ支部武裝ゲリラ軍ノ行動。英國政府ハ既ニカカル行動ヲ組織的ニ編成スル措置ヲ採レタ、合衆國政府モ同



様ノゾリヲ軍ヲ組織編成スル事ヲ勸ム

フアードソン上院議員

我等ハ此ノ計畫ヲ實行スルタメゾリヲ軍ヲ組織編成シマシタカ

マーシャル大將

私ノ知ル範圍ニ於テ、私ノ記憶スル限り十二月七日前ニハ組織編成シマシタ。支那ニ物資ヲ送ル以外ノコトデ私ガ確カニ記憶スル事ハ空軍猛進部隊ヲ裝備シテ事デアリ

フアードソン上院議員

義勇飛行隊デスカ

マーシャル大將

ソウデス。私自身彼等ニ飛行機ヲ得ル行動(三二三七)ヲトツタカラデス

フアードソン上院議員

義勇飛行隊トハ何デスカ

マーシャル大將

義勇飛行隊トハ飛行士ト戦闘機P.10ヨリ成ル部隊ヲ戦闘機ハ合衆國ガ供給シタモノト思ヒマス、而シテ其ノ部隊ハ合衆國陸海軍ノ義勇將校ガ操縦シタモノデシヨウ。又飛行家モ参加シタカモ知レマセンガ、私ハ十分確信ハアリマセン。

彼等ノ或者ハ豫備將校デ現役ヲハナレタノハ支部政府ノ雇人タリ得ルタデシタ。

飛行機ハ入手シマシタ。本件ニ關シ何カ利益關係ノ問題ガアリマスカ

フアーグソン上院議員

ソウデス

マーシャル大將

飛行機ハカーチス會社ト英國トノ契約ニ基キ入手シタ事ト思ヒマス。本契約ガ履行サレタ場合會社ハ當時入手シ得ル部分品ヲ使用シ十日以内ニ直チニ着手シタナラバ爾後數ヶ月内ニ一定數ノ飛行機ノ作製ハ可願デシタ、然ラザレバ組立方法ハ變ツタデシヨウ。カーチス會社ト英國ノ行動ヲ制限セシ本契約ノ取決メニ依リ我等ノ政府即チ陸軍省全般特ニ航空隊

關係者ハ契約條項以上ニ此等飛行機ヲ製作スベキト否ヤノ問題（三二三七）ヲ左右スル事ガ出來マシタ問題ハ支那ノタメニ直チニ飛行機ヲ入手スル事デシタ。

入手出來ル過剩ノ材料ヲ以ツテ製作シ得タ飛行機ノ完成モ三四ヶ月デハ出來ナカツタデシヨウ。

英國ガ追加飛行機ノタメ利益ヲ得ル限リ其レヲ取消スコトモ出來、或ハ私ガ言ツタ様ニ通商的立場カラ英國ニ行ク管ノ完成飛行機ヲ直チニ支那側ニ引渡スヨウ要求モ出來マシタ。而シテ在庫資材ヨリ製作シタ追加飛行機ハ後日英國ニ受取ラシメル事モ出來タ。

（三二三九）私ハサムナー・ウエルズ氏ト會見シマシタガ彼ハ英國ト話合セチツケマシタ、即チ上記ノ條件通シ英國ハ承知シマシタ。一月カ二月ニ五十臺ヲ入手、二月カ三月ニ更ニ五十臺ヲ入手シマシタ。此等飛行機ハ猛虎部隊用アリ極東ニ送ラレマシタ。支那人ニヨリ徵募サレタル飛行士及ビタマタマ豫備將校ヲ除除サレタ者ハ極東ニ行キマシタ。

本件ニ關シ次ニ思出スコトハ前記ノ立場カラ飛行機ハ英國トノ契約ヲ變



更シテ入手セシモノノ我國ガ統砲ト彈藥ヲ準備シナケレバナラニ狀況ニ  
アルコトガ判ツタノデス、然カモ之等ハ入手難キテ飛行機ヲ武裝スルカモ之等  
ノニ非常ニ困難チシテマシタ。

コレガ私ノ記憶スル限り一九四一年十二月七日前に於テ上述ノ程度ニ編成  
成シタ唯一ノハツキリシタ部隊デシタ。

フアーグソン上院議員

コレガ證據五十號關係ノ計畫ヲ明カニシタモノデシタカ。

マーシャル大將

左様トハ思ヒマセン。實際ハ宋子文ト又那空軍司令官トノワシントン訪  
問ニヨルモノデス。彼等ヲ私ノ家ニ邀食ニ招待シ其ノ折狀勢ニツキ印象  
的證明ヲキキマシタ。此ノ如キ行動ガ良果ヲ結ブ事ヲ感ジタノヲ直チニ  
資料入手ニ着手シマシタ。コレハ本計畫トハ何等關係ナク、今此處ヲ私  
ガ陳述スル事ハ(三二四〇)ノ讀キデス。

「眞珠灣攻撃」第三部一二二八—一二三〇頁

D. D. 1500-V-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson  
17 December 1940.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
Washington, Dec. 17, 1940.



Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations  
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.  
Subject: War Plans - Status and Readiness of in View of  
Current International Situation.  
Reference: (a) Cinc's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940

1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that a new war plan be issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 3 (W.P.L. 44) has recently been completed. Four advance copies have been forwarded to you by officer messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revisions of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1, as have been found desirable for making parts of that plan usable with Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as soon as practicable through the Registered Publication Section.

2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the most imminent and difficult war situation which may confront the United States in the near future. It is, therefore requested that the Commander in Chief prepare as soon as practicable the operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the Commander in Chief advised as to all matters within his own knowledge which related to current national policy and pending national decisions. This past practice will be continued in the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless aware that the changing world military situation will continue to affect policy, and thus will influence plans for the war operation of the naval forces. It is, of course, impracticable to draw up and to issue new Navy Basic War Plans when merely minor changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all probable situations which may arise in the near future where the principal portion of the national effort is directed westward. Under study now by the naval and army officials are plans based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the principal portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5), and also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere against attack from both the east and the west (Rainbow No. 4). So far as now can be foreseen, these three basic plans should be adequate to guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.

4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment on the present applicability of the Orange War Plan, as that Plan was drawn up to guide the prosecution of a war under circumstances which do not now exist.

5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK

辯護側文書第一五〇〇一V一號

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十二月十七日付  
海軍大將エイチ。アール。スタークより海軍大將ジェイ。オー。リチャードソン宛の書翰

一九四〇年十二月十七日  
ワシントン、海軍省、海軍作戦部長室に於て

秘

海軍作戦部長發

米國艦隊司令長官宛

題目一戦争計畫、

現下の國際情勢に鑑みての現状及用意

關係書翰一 一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月二十二日付

司令長官發秘密書翰A一六一〇二七〇五號

一 前記の書翰に於て貴下が新戦争計畫が發せらるべき旨勸告せられましたか、その御返事として海軍基本戦争計畫「レインボウ第三號」（W P L 四四）が最近完成した事をお知らせ致します。右計畫案四通は既に文書送達將校により御手許に發送済であります。本計畫の完成したる書類並びにW P L 一四二號即ち海軍基本戦争計畫「虹、第一號」の





修正書類、一同計畫の一部を「レインボウ第三號」と共に使用し得るやうにする爲めに斯くの如き修正をした方が好ましいといふ事が解つたのであるから此等の書類は出来るだけ速かに登録出版局を通じて頒布されます。

ニ戦争計畫「レインボウ第三號」は米國が近き將來に於て直面すべき最も緊急にして困難なる戦争情態に備へる爲めに立てられてゐます。其れ故に司令長官に於て「レインボウ第三號」によつて考察されてゐる戦争に對する作战計畫を出来るだけ速かに準備する様願ひます。

三海軍作战部長は過去に於て現在行はれてゐる國策及び懸案の國家的決定に關して自分の知つて居る事項は全部司令長官に知らして來ました斯の如き過去の習慣は將來も續ける積りであります。併しなから司令長官が御存知の通り世界軍事情勢の變轉により國策は引續き影響を受け従つて海軍の作战計畫も影響を蒙る事は勿論であります。たと國策上の些細の變更が起つたに過ぎない場合に新規の海軍基本戦争計畫を立案し發する事は勿論實際的ではありません。海軍作战部長は「レインボウ第三號」はその主要なる面に於て近き將來に起り得べき且つ國

家的努力の大半を要すると云ふ想定に基く計畫「レインボウ第五號」並びに「レインボウ第一號」に幾分類似し東西兩方よりの攻撃に對する西半球全体の防衛を包含する計畫「レインボウ第四號」は只今陸海軍當局によつて検討されて居ります。現在豫見し得る限りに於て此等三基本計畫は現在豫見し得る凡ゆる不慮の場合に際して動員、初期展開及び初期作戰を指導するに適してゐる筈であります。

四 前述したる事實に鑑み「オレンヂ戦争計畫」を現在適用し得るや否やに付き述べる事は不必要と思ひます。何となれば同計畫は現在存在しない情勢に於ける戦争の遂行を指導する爲めに立てられたものだからであります。

五 本文書は緊急を要するものでありまして此の次の文書送達將校によつて受信人に送達されるのでは間に合ひません。

其れ故に發信者は米國の大陸地域内は書留郵便で本文書を送達し得る認可を與へます。

エイチ。アール。スターク（署名）

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII  
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(15) 28 November 1941 from Western Defense Command to Marshall.  
Subject: Reply to Marshall warning.

(15)

Secret

Received: November 28, 1941.  
11:18 PM

From: HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,  
To: General George C. Marshall  
November 28th:

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and sub-sector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific Coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense (15A) of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DeWITT, Commanding.

(Pages 1330 - 1331 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")





辯護側文書 一五〇〇一V 二

合衆國第七十九議會 第一會期

眞珠灣攻撃共同調査委員證據文書第三十二號拔萃

證據文書 第三十二號

陸軍省布 間通報、自一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月八日より

至

九月七日

(十五)

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十八日西部防衛管區ヨリ  
マーシャル宛、主門マーシャル等ヨリ對スル返信

(十五)

秘

受信 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十八日

午後十一時十八分

自 カリフォルニア州、サンフランシスコ西部防衛管區要塞地區司令部  
宛 密着ーデ・シー・マーシャル元帥  
十一月二十八日



十一月二十七日ノ實官無電ニヨリ採ラレタル以下處置報告

實官無電ハ A D O . 第二空軍・第四空軍・第九空軍 A O A D . 太平洋沿岸領域  
扇形戰區、第九軍團地區各司令官、並ニ第十一、第十二及第十五海軍地區  
各指揮官宛義解終結セリ。

全港口ヲ扼スル岬地ハ引續キ人員ヲ配備セリ。各港ノ防衛ニ一砲兵中隊ヲ營  
テ引續キ警戒中。サボターヂニ其ノ他破壞行動ニ對スル防衛ハ強化サレタリ。  
歩兵六大隊及ビ所屬ノ自動車輸送ハ O G N O A 第九軍團地區司令官「ガレ  
イ」ボー五（虹第五）下ニ於ケル其ノ使命ヲ遂行スベク直チニ利用シ得ラル  
機待機シアリ。軍團地區及ビ海軍地區司令官トノ接觸ハ關係ナク保持セラレ、  
全軍團協力ハ保證セラル。P O F (太平洋沿岸領域) 扇形戰區及ビ扇形戰  
區計畫ハレイシンボー五之ヲ事實上完了シ、危險地域ノ防衛實施ノ爲メ所  
屬ノ偵察ハ行ハレツ。アリ。二小銃中隊歩哨勤務ノ爲メ E N O G S F P ニ、  
又一中隊ハエンデエル島抑留外人ノ爲メ O G N O A (第九軍團地區司令官)  
ニ配備セラレタリ。此ノ報告ニ關聯シ W P L 五ニヲ發見シ太平洋沿岸及ビ  
日本船舶ヲ含ムベキコトヲ知メ又ソレニ付小官ノ採リタル處置ノ結果ヲ述ベ

タル十一月二十五日 O G D E Q (總司令部) 宛小官ノ無電ヲ参照アリタシ  
 W L P 五二又ハレインボー五ノ準備段階ノ實施ニハ空軍並ニ他ノ陸軍部隊ノ  
 參加ヲ見ルベキニ付、P O F (太平洋沿岸領域)ノ防衛(一五A)ニ於ケル  
 空軍作戦ヲ指揮スベキ權限ヲ小官ニ與ヘラルルカ又ハ空軍ノ行動ヲ指示スベ  
 キ指令ガ發セラレ、且ツ小官ニ斯ル指令ノ寓ヲ送達サレンコトヲ力説スルモ  
 ノナリ。週帶ナク入手セラルベキ軍需品及ビ追撃、爆撃機ノ甚ダシキ不足ナ  
 キ限り、一度敵對行動開始セラレンカ本管區ハ日本ニ關スル限りレイシボト  
 五ニヨリ制當テラレタル任務ヲ遂行スベク今ヤ其ノ準備中レリ。

デウキツト指揮官

(「眞珠灣攻撃」第十四卷 一三三〇—一三三一頁)



Defense Doc. 1500-V-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DISPATCHES

(37) 27 November 1941 to OPNAV, Action: COM1-13, 15, NAVY YARD WASHINGTON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA.

(37) Top Secret

27 November 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: Coms 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Gov-  
ernor Guam & Samoa

Info:

272338

(Paraphrase)

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operations X  
Publicity to be avoided.

(Page 1406, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



Def. Doc. # 1500-V 3

知照御意 一五〇〇一V 一三

眞受渡被ヨリ抜萃一米歐第七十九國證  
第一三七期

書證第三七號

發信聲報ニ應スル主要書證

(三七) 一九四一年十一月二十七日附海軍作戦部、關係行動者、第一

第十三、第十五司令部、華府海軍工廠、ガム及サモア各長官

(三七) 版 秘

一九四一年十一月廿七日附

發信者、海軍作戦部

關係行動者 第一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十五各司令部

華府海軍工廠、ガム及サモア長官

情報通告先 二七二三三八

(譯 海)



Def. Loc. # 1500-V 3

各司令官ハ「オレンジ」交渉ノ破局ニ因リ起ルコトアルベキ  
破局的行動及「サボタージ」的行動ニ備ヘテ又「オレンジ」作戦擴大ノ  
危険性増大ニ對シテ適切ナル安全措置ヲ講ズベシ。部外ヘノ発表ヲ避  
ケヨ。



EXCERPTS FROM EXHIBIT NO. 47  
HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE  
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
(Telegram received)

TK. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (80).

From Chungking via N.R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 8:48 P.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

435, November 3, 5 p.m.; (Section One).

Reference my 431 not rec'd in Dept. of November 1, 11 a.m.

Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's President which was telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will make it available to the Department. I am forwarding copy by air mail unless instructed to repeat it by radio.

The message differs in form but not in substance from that originally summarized to me by Foreign Minister.

It is not yet certain that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Yunnan from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any case large Japanese air forces will operate from that base against the Burma Road within China against the American or any other volunteer air force when they enter China.

It is true, of course, that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions in the Far East.

If it should be found possible, it is practicable to send American air units into Yunnan they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air concentrations.

KLP

/s/ GAUSS

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(Telegram Received)

DES. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (80).

From Chungking via N.R.

Dated November 3, 1941

Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

Priority 435, November 3, 5 p.m.; (Section Two).

Half on taken measures would prove disastrous. Maintenance and supply of such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road, operation of which would probably need to be under strict military control. Advance depots of supplies would need to be built and stocked. Time factor is of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks we are to move in immediate future.

The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

BB

(Handed me by Mr. Liu XI-441, 9:30 a.m. /s/ SKH)

Telegram from Chungking November 2, 1941

(Rec'd from S. File - H. F. F.)

Confidential.

Message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt.

"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr. Winston Churchill:

"Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yunnan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of expansion either northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and my right to impress upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.

"Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely one objective of Japan's war of aggression on China but is a first and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

"You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can our army do against another that is strong in the air? A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

"For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in the field and thus immobilized the (3) man-power of Japan. The implications of this must be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of



the European (?) war may hang upon it.

"If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh-enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this (4) war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they mean to do, one by one, I am most asking you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, so make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

"You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she is --- by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will (5) turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British, and American willingness to cooperate in the defense of Yunnan. If the Japanese can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression."

"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America; if the United States would throw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation, I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You (6) are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now



[illegible][illegible][illegible]

themselves, sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan - in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

(Signed) R. A. BOONE  
For A. H. McCollum

Distribution: Original and 1 copy to DNI - Copy No. 1 and 2

OO-Op-16-F-Copy No. 3

Op-10/11-Copy No. 4

Op-12-Copy No. 5

File-Copy No. 6

\*\*\*\*\*

October 28, 1941  
2:42 P.M.

NPM 5342  
Filed 0140

Priority

From: CHUNGKING

To: FOR AMMISCA

Number 28. October 28th

Part 1. Especial attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Generalissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied by MacMorland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep appreciation for the sending of the mission.

In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission I outlined my conception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel could collaborate on the solution. These were: 1, the communications problem; 2, the aviation project; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces; 4, the supply of raw materials; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of new material.

Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the Chinese air force and referring to Chennault's volunteer force as the only aviation that counted.

He requested with emphasis that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take over his air force.

(2) I had no opportunity to comment on these points.

Becoming intently earnest he said there was another emergency about which he wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.



Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kuning from Indo-China and cut the Burma Road. He expects the attack by the end of November. By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissimo insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kuning were lost. In his analysis he argued that Kuning was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China would fall, and the attack on Malay Asia would inevitably follow. War in the Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be saved. But China must have air support, he repeated. The British should reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity of this course of action. Although not so expressed, it was to be inferred that no other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American reinforcements of any kind, pleading the critical situation he repeatedly said that only British air support could save China and peace in the Pacific.

Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intercede with London to make available the Singapore Air Forces to support his defense. Also he requested me personally to appeal to the British commander in chief in Singapore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administration to the effect that a movement (3) southward by Japan would be considered inimical to American interests, he argued that our govt could properly interpret an attack on Kuning in that light. Even worse, since it would be the first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China would be infringed.

Part 5. He then pled that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon Kuning would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed, would cause Japan to desist.

In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense depended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support. I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurances of air support if Kuning were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.

I told the generalissimo that I could transmit this request to the Secretary of War.



Defense Document No. 1500-V-4

(4) Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Increments of lend lease aviation material contemplated will be too little and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

MAGRUDER

THESE EXCERPTS ARE FROM PART 15 - JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87 - HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES - PAGES 1476, 1477, 1478, 1479, 1480 and 1481.

Ref DOO NO. 1500-V-4

婦膠側文書 第一五〇〇—V—四

米國々會に於ける眞珠灣攻撃聯合調査委員會關係  
提出番號第四七號よりの拔萃

(受信電文)

TK 本電文は他への連絡に先立 嚴密に解讀せらるべし。(S.C.)

發信 重慶より N.R. 經由

一九四一年十一月三日附

午後八時四十八分受電

國務長官

ワシントン

四三五 十一月三日 午後五時 (第一部)

十一月一日午前十一時附、國務省 (譯者註、以下二字ノ意味不明) 余の  
四三一號を參照せられ度し



胡適に昨日發信された 總帥より大統領宛の聲明の寫しが外交部長から只今送られてきた、趙適は勿論之を國務省の便覽に供するであらう若し無電で電の電文を反復するやう指令がない限り私は航空便により本文寫しを送達する。趙適は形式は異なるが内容は最初に、趙部長が要約して私に傳へたる處を讀みはない。

未だ日本が印度支那から雲南に對し、困難な侵入を開始するといふといふのは確實でない、然し如何なる場合にも日本空軍大勢力が印度支那を基地として支那領土内のビルマ道路に對し又アメリカ又は其他に義勇空軍が中國領空内に入りたる時に對して行動を發するであらう事は確實であると余は信ずるものである。

勿論、雲南に對する日本軍攻撃が大敗を喫するならば狀勢は極東に於ける日本の野望を抑制するに大いに有利に展開するであらう。

若し雲南に對し英米合同空軍部隊を派遣する事が可能であり實際的である事が判明したならば之を日本の大集中空軍力に對應するに足るべく十分強力のものでなければならぬ。

K L P

ガウス



Def DOO NO.1500-V-4

(受 電)

DES 本電文は他への連絡に先立ち嚴密に解讀せらるべし (80)

發信ト重慶からN・R・經由

一九四一年十一月三日附

四日午後六時四十五分通信

國務長官

ワシントン

順位

四三五、十一月三日午後三時 (第二部)

中途半端の又は形ばかりの手段は非難の結果を招くであらう。露言に於て斯の如き空軍を維持し之に補給するにはビルマ道路諸施設に大なる負擔をかけ且つその運用は有力なる軍の管理の下に爲される事が恐らく必要であらう。前線補給所を直ちに設置する事が必要であらう。總帥が考ふる如く若し日本側が直ちに行動しようとしてゐるならば時間的要素が最重要の問題である。

若し日本側による雲南侵略が成功すれば、恐らく中國の士氣は非常に影響され且つ組織的抵抗を繼續してゆくに必要なる物資の供給は不能になるであらう。然しながら、私は、之が支那に於ける日本の間口を速かに解決する結果を齎すものは信にない。日本は尙ほ無期限に中國に於て大軍を維持しなければならぬ事を發見するであらう

(通信終り)

ガウス (署名)

B B

(劉氏より手文一九四一年十一月四日、午前九時三十分SKH (署名) 4  
一九四一年十一月二日自廣より電報

送りファイルより受信 H・E・F)

親展

ルナズベルト大統領宛蔣介石總帥の通信

「現下の急速なる危險狀勢の進展は中國に於ける軍事狀勢全般を變轉せしめる虞れあるに鑑み私はウインストンチャーチル氏に對し左の如き見解を

通達しました。

「私が十分に信頼を寄する處の情報によれば、日本側は昆明を占取し英國及び米國に對する中國の信通路を遮斷すべく印度から雲南を攻取することに意を決してゐます。準備は既に着手せられて居り攻取は近々に行はれるであります。私の見解では、之は北方又は南方に段線を擴大せんとする彼等の政策の第一段階なのであります。この故に私は現下の諸狀勢を、程度まで貴下に御報知すべきであると思ふのであります。未來を左右する力の多くは貴下の手中に有するのでありますから一貴下に充分の了解を促す事が實に私の義務且つ權利であると感じて居るものであります」

「一度昆明が奪取せられたならば日本側にとつては背面攻撃を受ける一切の憂慮がなくなるであらうませう。私は、昆明占領は日本が中國に對して行つてゐる侵略戦争の單なる一個の目的であるばかりでなく又日本を別の新しい企圖に向つて解放する爲に必要の第一段階なのであるといふ事を貴下は誰よりも先に認められうであらうと信じます。」



而して來りつゝ、あるのみが如何に致命的に貴國並に我國をも含めた太平洋沿岸の國々全体の安全性に關係を有するかを貴下は篤く御承知でありませう。「貴下は、私が昆明方面に最善を盡す事に間違ひは無く且私の軍隊が昆明を守り得ると貴下に御報告した時は之を信じてよいといふことを御存じです。然し貴下は、私同様、私が力を出さない事實を知つて居られます。もして空軍が無しには我々は強大なる空軍力を有する軍隊と對抗して何を爲し得るでありませうか。地圖を一瞥すれば若し昆明が陥落したら中國は外部からの供給遮断せられその影響は甚大なり。貴國及び其他の友好諸國の軍隊との接觸を断たれてしまふであらうことが分るでありませう、加之、中國の軍隊並に國民の士氣は地に墮つるでありませう。我友好國が直接我々に手を貸す事の出来ない東部國境に在つて我等の士氣は四ヶ年以上も保たれて來たのであります。然るにこの國境のみならず、我が全國民も知る如く我國を我が友好國の軍隊が手を伸せば互に遠せんばかりの距離に接近して居り、しかも、此の國境に於て、日本軍が勝利を占むる事となりますならば國民は大いに脅

威を感じるでありませう。さうしたら、抗敵力の實質的崩壊會いませう。この長期  
開始つて以來初めて起るでありませう。

「既に四ヶ年以上中国は約五百萬の兵力を戦線に留め、漸くして日本の人  
力を一定の場所に固着せしめてきました、

之は何故であるかといふ事を言下は明瞭に御分りでありませう。これは言下  
並に其他の我友邦諸國が既に認められた事であると思ひます、若し中国が陷  
落したならば日本は總ゆる警戒を捨て去り全勢力を他の地點に向ける事が出来  
るでありませう。故に逆りつ、ある間は單に中國一個の勝敗の間口ではな  
く太平洋の平和と保全の成否にかかはる間口であります。實際、欧州（一）  
戦争の成敗如何も關つて此處に在するといつても過言ではないのであります  
「若し中國が自國の必要とする空軍力を持つてゐたならば私は中國が侵入  
者に打撃つ力量のある事を確信して居りますから、言下に對して懇請するた  
はしないのでせう。然し我々は中國に對する日本側の壓迫に對抗すべき空軍と  
呼び、あのものは何等有つてゐないのであります。日本側は彼等の最も立派な強

力なる空軍を用ひてくる事は必定と思はれるのであります。然し若し我國に於て日本空軍が阻止せられ又は破碎せられるといふやうな事があれば私が新しき全國と呼んだ處のものを開始すべき日本の力は大いに減殺されるでありませう日本の海軍はなほ存在するでありませうが、然しながら空に於ける勢力なくしては日本は多くを爲し得ず、之無くしては日本の地位は終りとなるでありませう。その時から日本は政治的經濟的壓迫に於て屈服せしめられるやうになるでせう。それでありませうから、又戦争で別の場合で日本軍が犯したやうな誤謬を我々に犯さしめないで下さい。而して日本軍が企圖してあるやうに彼等をして我方を一つ一つ攻撃せしめて下さい。私は日本に對して開戦宣言をして下さい。一つであるものではありません私は單に、空に於ては我國は敵に對抗出来ないものである事を明かにし、之が何を意味するかを貴下に語り、且つ一つの救済方法を示唆せんが爲に、私自身は置かれてある立場について貴下に明瞭に了解して頂き度いと欲するのであります、目下訓練中のアメリカ義勇空軍は非常に優秀であるが規模が非常に



小さいのであります。戦後の唯一の望みはマライに在るイギリス空軍がアメリカの協力を得て行動を起し、アメリカ義勇空軍並に既存の中口空軍を支援するであらうといふ事でありませう。英口空軍は中國空軍の一部として協力するか、又は一個の國際義勇軍としての役割を取る事が出来るであらませう。而してその結果は中口を救ひ太平洋を救ふ事になるであらませう。

「中口下は一瞥して、この間口は一方に於て歐洲及アジア中部で非常に勇敢に闘つてをられる貴英口を更に、日本との口に捲込むやうにならうと思ひになるかも知れませう。が私は別の考へ方をしております。中口が抵抗力を固く持しである限り日本は自分が之に對する攻撃力を持つてゐると思つてゐないと思へませう、然し一度中口の抵抗力を排除したならば日本は自分に都合のよい方法を以つて都合のよい時に、中口を掩護する事ありませう中口の抵抗力が續くか否かは中口に對し只今私が示唆したやうな行動によつて（T.M.）原文不定全一雲南に於ける英口空軍の行動の重要性を輕視する事は出来ませうまい。何故かといへば、に今後の民主義方針の運命が掛つてゐる間のでありますから。中口は抵抗の最も危險な段階に達してあります。」

陸路よりシンガポール及びビルマに接近する敵を中口が防ぎ得るか否かは、  
 今やかたつて、雲南陸軍に對するイギリス、並にアメリカの協力如何に依存  
 してあるのではありません。若し日本軍が此處に於ける我々の口線を打破する事  
 が出来るならば我々は皆一口と遮断せられ幾國の、アメリカと蘭領東印度  
 諸島との間の海空軍の連絡の全組織は新しい方法により、新しい方向から大  
 なる脅威を受けるであります。私は智謀と先見の明ある者は必ず、中口に  
 對して我々の云つた如き懸念が容れられるべきであると主張するであらうと  
 いふ確信を、私の全力を盡して、確信 度いのであります。この結果として  
 齎されるのは日本の敗北と今侵略の目的も、諸島の奪取の目的でもありません  
 一又私は陸軍準將マグルノダート、右の會話中の作口固口を討議し、私が雲  
 南作戦によつて決定的重要性を有するものと考へてある事柄を貴下に傳へて  
 貰ふやう彼に頼みました。之に加へて更に私は自分の左の如き確信を力説致  
 し度いのであります。即ち、日本に對處すべき英口側の決定は目下アメリカの  
 指導と對戰的影響に俟つ處多い、言ひかへれば、アメリカがこの共同作戦に

現役の部隊又は余備軍を設置すべく、フイリツピンに在る自国へアメリカ  
 の空軍を召喚するかどうかといふ點に對つてあるのです。日本が斷呼  
 としつゝ而も直ちに阻止されないならば日本は我々に對し個々別に且つ日本に  
 有利な時機に對抗して來られるやうな地歩と將に克ち得やうとしてあるのぢ  
 あります。日本を阻止する機會はこの瞬間しかありません、大統領閣下貴下  
 は(2)侵略と云ふ民主国家の先頭に立つ指導者として認められて居る方であり  
 ます。貴下は現在の必迫せる状況の要求する速度で速かに行動して下さるで  
 あらうと余は信ずるものであります。今や、歐洲の政治家達が犯した誤謬、  
 即彼等がナチ・ドイツをして自分達の間を裂かしめナチ・ドイツをして指導  
 的地位を獲得せしめた處の誤謬を避り、而して日本が連續的且つ個々別に我  
 らを攻撃を誘ひつゝて極東に於ける第二のナチ・ドイツに發展する事を防止す  
 る事が根本的に必要なのであります。

蔣介石（署名）



返信に因しては

〇 P-161 P-12 読参照

寫し第一號

一九四一年十一月一日

ワシントン

海軍省 海軍作戦部

海軍情報局

秘電

局長宛電

〇 在野軍（アルム）より電報、三八五

7E?

つ本電報に於て海軍少佐マツタ・ヒューは日本軍がビルマ道路を切斷すべく  
北部印度支那から將に滿進を開始せんとしてあるものと測定します。更  
に彼はこの進軍を阻止すべき唯一の望は全英極東空軍部隊——之は雲南省  
内の駐紮機隊及び飛行場を外國へ誘ふはアメリカが把握し支配すること  
を要求するであります。この全英極東空軍部隊が作戦に積極的に

参加することにあらずと述べて居ります

二月下大統領ルーズベルトに對し發せられてあると米國大使が述べてある  
 聲明の中で、蔣介石は、日本軍は三十日以内にビルマ道路を切斷すべく  
 猛進を開始するであらうと述べてあります。彼（蔣介石）はこの狀勢を  
 陸軍少佐マツタヒューよりも幾分輕くみてあります。蔣は自分はビルマ道  
 路を守るに足る地上兵力を所有してあるが、空軍支持を必要とするであ  
 らうと云つてゐます。

彼はシンガポール及びマニラに於ける有力なる英米空軍が義勇軍の形で  
 援助して呉れる事を欲してゐる事を悉して居ります。中國の飛行場並に  
 通信機口に對する外國の支配に關しては何事も云つて居ないのでありま  
 す。

三、印度支那口境線と昆明との間の地形が極めて檢惡なる點を考慮すれば、  
 若し中國が口境を英米から空軍の援助が與へられるならば、中國はこの  
 日本の進軍を阻止する事が出来るであらうと思はれてをります。

日本側は日下印度支那に於て十萬以下の兵力しか有つてあません。日本が來る三十日間には幾許の兵員を其處へ送る事が出来るかは謎であります。彼等はへ北方に於てロシアを威嚇してある一現在の集中兵力を保持し、中國にある現在の守備軍を保持し、而して同時に、この雲南に對する進攻の爲に二十萬以上の軍隊を置くことは不可能であると考へられるのであります。

四、茲に於いて直に問題となるのは「中國は口ふ意志を有する哉」といふ事でありませう。之に因連して露南省政府主席龍雪は既に汪精衛に買収されたとかに買収されるとかいふ噂が喋々せられてあります。若し斯の如き事案が發生すれば蔣介石、英國又はアメリカはドルで道路を救ふ爲に殆ど何事をも爲し得ないであります。しかしこの噂には確證はないのであります。英支那人の性格も同様考慮に入れなければなりません。彼等は援助の約束が爲へられ、ば彼等自身は口ふことを止めて後方に引退り而して援軍の到着を待つといふ一態度向が非常に強いのであります。この理由から中國に對して公りに多くを約束しないかよいと思はれるのであります。



もう一つの點を指摘しなければならせん。マツタヒュー陸軍少佐が報告することは米英兩國が日本に對し限局的行動を取る事、約言すれば日本と事實上限局を交へる事でありませう。我國が斯く總ゆる輸送困難の障害を受けつゝ、遠く西部雲南省に軍隊裝備を輸送するよりは、むしろ日本と口はんとするならば、既に設置せられてある我基地から日本の補給路及び本土基地を攻撃し、かくして日本の同心をビルマ道路から逸らす方が賢明でありませうであらう。

(署名) R. A. ブリン

A. H. マネコラム代理

配布 R D N I 宛原文並に寫し一編 寫し第一號及び二號

CG-OP-16-

第三號

OP-10/11-

第四號

OP-12-

第五號

File-

第六號

RPM 五三四二

綴り 〇一四一

順位

電信地 東京

宛 先 R P O R A M M I S O A

第二十八番 十月二十八日

第一部特に陸軍長官及び参謀長の注意あり度し、私はマツタ、モナランドを伴ひ我々の到着以來不暇であつた大統領に、今日面會しました。音信並に友誼交換の後彼は使節派遣に對し深い謝意を表明しました。

使節の目的に對する彼の反響を見る爲に、私は武器貸與法による物資並に勢力の援助を有効ならしむべき方法に關する自分の考への概略を話しました。私は武器貸與法を適用するについての五つの異なる軍事上の問題を示唆し我々の使節がその解決に對して協力し得ることを述べました、それは即ち聯絡問題、航空計畫、陸軍再編成に關する裝備の補給、原料の補給、新裝備に對する訓練及び維持等でありました。

一九四一年十月二十八日

午後二時四十二分

第二部、彼は之等五つの同口を留めて、斯の如き解決方法に対する満足の意を表明し、それから早速に航空同口をこのうちの最も必迫せる同口として取上げました。彼は同口に中國空軍力を無視しチエノルトの義勇軍を算へるに足る唯一の空軍であると言及して、露骨に使節が彼の航空部隊を引續き之を指揮し、發展せしめて欲しいと思つてゐる事を述べました。

彼は彼の空軍を繼承すべき高級の空軍將校を派遣して呉れるやうに力を籠めて懇請しました。

私は之等諸同口に同じ意見を述べる機会がありませんでした。

彼は非常に熱して來て、もう一つ、即時援助を乞ひ度い緊急同口があると申しました。詳細は後刻報告

第三部、日本軍は印度支那から昆明を攻撃しビルマ道路を切斷すべく用意を怠へて居ると彼へ(T.N.I. 蔣介石)は云いました。彼はこの攻撃が十一月の末までには行はれると予期してゐます。彼は地上兵力を集中してこの攻撃に抵抗する事が出来るが但しその爲には空軍の支援を要するのであると云ひました



それから、後に質問に答へてもし空軍の援助が與へられるやうならば日本に打勝つ兵力は持つてゐると強調しました。蔣總帥は若し昆明を失へば中國はもう抵抗すべき地を持たない事を執拗に云ひましたが正にその通りであります。彼は事態を解剖して次の様に論じました。即ち、昆明は太平洋に對する鍵であり、若し其處が陷ちれば中國も敗北する事になり之に續いて必然的にマレーイ一帯が攻められるであらう。さうすれば必ず太平洋戦争が始まる。若し中國が持つてゐる事が出来れば太平洋も波を立てずに済むかもしれない。然し（その爲には）中國に對して空軍の援助が與へられなければならぬのであると彼は繰返して云ひました。英國側はアメリカの義勇軍部隊を補強すべきである。英國側はこのやうな行動方針の必要なる事を納得せしめなければならぬ。總帥は口に出してさうとは云ひませんでした。かういふ方法以外には間に合ふ援助は與へられないのである事を訴へてゐるものと推察されました。彼は、アメリカの援助については、一度も、またどんな種類のものについても言及せず危急の情勢を訴へて英國空軍の支援のみが中國及び太

平洋の平和を救ふ事が出来るのであると繰返し申しました。

第四部それから總帥は私が險惡な情勢を直ちにワシントンへ知らせ且つ、彼の防禦隊を援助するシンガポール空軍の使用を可能ならしめるべくロンドンと折衝することを大統領に懇請するや、私は直接依頼しました。同時に又彼は私に對して個人的に同様の旨をシンガポールの英軍總指揮官に嘆願して呉れるやう依頼しました。

彼は日本の軍方進出はアメリカの權益に反するものと思考せられるといふ旨を記した或る施政新聞文を引用して、我が英政府が昆明に對する日本軍の攻撃を斯の如き説諭から停戦を下す事が出来、さうする事は誤りを犯さぬ解明ふ事を力説しました。もつと悪い事には「昆明攻撃」は日本が中国の南部に於てもつと強力な軍事行動をとるその手始めなのであるから、若し、ビルマ道路が断たれ中国の抵抗力が排除されば、アメリカが中国と通商する權利も侵害されるであらうと彼はつけ加へました。

第五部、彼はそれから次のことを大統領に報告することを懇請しました。

即ち日本に外交的壓迫を加へる事及び、英國を誘つて協同で昆明攻撃は我々の利益に反するものと考へられるといふ警告を日本に與へることであり、また、  
このいふ方向をとれば日本は断念するであらうと彼は信じて居りました。  
状況斯の如くして、私はこの會見を自分が行動する權利を與へられてある方  
向に向ける機會がなかつたのでありました。私は一度機會を把へてビルマ鐵  
路に對する作戦缺如の危險性を指摘し英口側が全面的に援を與へるか否かに  
拘らず彼の交通狀態を改良する事が防禦成否の鍵であることを述べました  
私は更に、英國が支援拒否の理由として、ビルマ道路の現在の狀態に於ては  
英口側その空軍部隊に補給すること爲不可能であるといふ議論を持ち出すか  
も知れない事に彼の注意を促しました。道路に關しては我々使節口はその狀  
態改善の爲に、技術一的助力を提供する用意はあるけれども政治上の困難せ  
る諸問題は中國人自身によつて解決されなければならぬであらうといふ事  
を明にしました。

第六部、總帥は、彼が微同にわたり英國大使との間に空軍援助問題を取上げ  
た事を私に告げました。時夫人は側にあつては、中國側は若しシンガポール



が攻撃されたならば大地兵力を以て英園を支援する保障を與へたけれども、英園側は若し昆明が攻撃を受けても英園領が侵略されない限り中国に對して空の援助をする保障は出來ぬと答へたと聲明しました。

私は總帥のこの要訣を陸軍長官に傳達し得るといふ事を告げました。

私はこの會見に先立つて先づ昆明攻撃の蓋然性に關して無線電文を起草して置きました。刻下の狀勢はこの蓋然性を強く指摘してあります。若し昆明攻撃が成功すれば中國の抗日は終焉を告げることとなるのは疑もないことです。又有効的な空軍援助がなくては、日本軍がこの決定的攻撃に成功する可能性のあることも全く間違ひのない所であります。

第七部、昆明は一時的ではあるが、太平洋への要害地となつたと云つても過言ではありますまい。中國空軍には全然戰局的價值がありません。アメリカ義勇軍は、それ自身の爲では、現在の空軍力と現在の艦の裝備とを以てしては、所期の効果を收め得ることは出來ません、且又こゝ、數ヶ月間は昆明準備を怠へることも出來ません。計費中の貸與航空材料は増加を計つても、それ

位では是に於て少に過ぎ、時間に於て晩きに失するのであります。有效なる  
對支援助に現在間に合ふものは、僅かにシンガポール駐屯英空軍だけである  
それに又多分比島から編成部隊を派遣することも間に合ふであります。  
私はこの會見の内容に就き吾が國大使と討議しましたが、彼はこの無口電  
文を一讀されました。

マグルーダー

以上の抜萃は、合衆國議會眞珠灣攻陥共同調査委員會審問第十五部、  
共同委員會證據書類第四十四號より第八十七號に至る、一四七六頁、  
一四七七頁、一四七八頁、一四七九頁、一四八〇頁、一四八一頁から  
であります。

Letter from Admiral C. C. Bloch via Admiral Richardson  
to Admiral Stark - 30 December 1940.

C-A16-1/A7-2/MD14  
(629)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
AND

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

30 Dec. 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.  
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the  
Fleet and the Present Ability of the  
Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise  
Attacks.

References: (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.  
(b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.  
(c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal  
letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22  
November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).  
(d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.  
(e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in refer-  
ences (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write  
this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourt-  
eenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of  
an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor  
will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there  
are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and  
destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second,  
by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns  
and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense  
forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which  
to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to  
the local defense forces to attack carriers when located  
would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian  
area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified  
as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the  
planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is  
my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory  
for the purpose intended. New bombing planes are expected  
sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941.  
For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be  
made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by  
the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have  
been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-  
aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-  
six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete.  
Some of them are six years old and some of them are four  
years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious de-  
ficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40



D. D. 1500-W-1

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is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for  
Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be pro-  
bable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear  
adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the  
Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii  
twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch  
guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered  
in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber  
out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 306 .50 caliber  
machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of  
the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other  
military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to  
increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to  
have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore,  
I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with  
a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The  
Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of  
Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to  
have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to  
defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order  
that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited  
knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad,  
I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size  
and range will be required for the efficient defense of the  
Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter  
and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned  
an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar  
stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are  
mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future,  
this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would  
be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in con-  
junction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose.  
Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer  
Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces.  
These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready  
for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-sub-  
marine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will  
be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu  
and the other islands. At present, the district has none  
and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such  
vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important  
work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any con-  
sidered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the

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entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably  
be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be  
completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped  
one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing  
and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out  
for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is  
seriously injured. The district has no vessels available  
for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine  
sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery  
dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will  
be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor,  
Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on  
Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and  
Newiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now  
being built or purchased, the general situation will be  
improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered  
adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection  
from the batteries.

6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the  
lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government  
reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered  
reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public  
highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and  
each tank with an earth barn. Its chief exposure is along  
the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry  
stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights.  
This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the  
entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered  
fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and  
an arrangement has been made, the Marines alternating with  
the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric  
supply lines through which outside power is received.



D. D. 1500-W-1

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8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH



辯證文書一五〇〇一W一

昭和十五年十二月三十日 C. C. ブロック海軍大將よりリチャードソン海軍大將を通じてスターク大將に宛てたる音信

CIA 一六一〇七<sup>1/2</sup>一四 (六二九)

アメリカ合衆國第十四海軍區司令部及ハワイ真珠灣海軍造船所

昭和十五年十二月三十日

秘

第十四海軍區司令官

海軍作戦部長

アメリカ艦隊司令長官 經由

件名、艦隊の安全度及奇襲に對する地方防衛軍の現在能力に對する件

關係書類イ、昭和十五年十月海軍作戦部發第〇九二一三五號

ロ、昭和十五年十月海軍作戦部發第一八二一二八號

ハ、昭和十五年十一月二十二日附米國艦隊司令長官宛海軍作

戦部長私信(爲、第十四海軍區司令官に送付済)

Ref Doc # 1500 W-1

ニ、昭和十五年十月海軍區司令官發第一五〇〇五五號

ホ、昭和十五年十月第十四海軍區司令官發第二二〇二三〇號

一、關係書類イ、ロ、及ハにありたる場合に鑑み本書面により、現存  
裝備並に勢力を以て敵の奇襲に對する第十四海軍區の現在の能力に  
就いて述べることは適當と思考せらる

## 二、空襲

眞珠灣海軍基地に對する空襲が空母を以てせらることは疑ない。之  
には二つの襲撃方法がある。第一は敵機の離艦前に於て母艦の所在を  
を発見之を襲撃する方法である。第二は高射砲及機關銃によつて攻  
撃し來れる爆撃機を襲撃する方法である、方面防衛官には敵空母の  
所在を発見する爲の遠距離偵察用航空機無く、且敵空母を発見して  
も之を攻撃する地方防衛官の航空機は陸軍爆撃機のみである。陸軍  
はハワイ地區には七―一八爆撃機五八基を有するもこれ等はいづれ  
も舊式に屬する。

型は六年前のものであり、總そのものは五年前の製作である。依つ

Ref No #1500 W-1

て小官は予期目的の爲には機敏に於ても型式に於ても満足なるものにあらざりと思考せらる。將來に於ては新鋭爆撃機の到來を期待し得るも、それは昭和十六年七月以後のことである。遠距離偵察に於ては、艦隊に於て割當て得るだけの餘力を海上力として此の方に向けるゝよう要請したのである。

敵爆撃機の離艦後に之を撃退せんには、戦闘機及高射砲共に必要である。ハワイ地區の陸軍は追撃機三十六基を有するも、是等はすべて舊式に屬し、機齡六年のもの或は四年のものであり、格段に於て型に於て甚しく缺陷のあることが認められるのである。新鋭戦闘機の到來はD-1四〇がハワイに對し一八五基も配備さるゝ程度に製作される場合に之を期待し得るのであつて、これは昭和十六年末迄は見込はまづなく又この數も適當ではないうである。

陸軍は高射砲による真珠灣防衛の任に當つてゐるのであるがハワイには三インチ定着砲二十六門、三インチ可動砲四十四門があり、昭和十六年度に於て二十四門の増加配備が計畫されてゐる。且予定